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I 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all the parties of record. As set forth in the 
brief hereafter, however, the appellant contends that the 
real respondent is not the respondent of record but the 
assignee of said respondent, to wit one Keith L. Gurr, 
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IV 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Sec. 78-2a-3(h) U.C.A. 1953 confers jurisdiction 
on this Court to hear this appeal since this is a domestic 
relations case. 
V 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Whether the lower court erred in not amending 
Exhibit ,fAn to the property settlement referred to in their 
divorce decree to carry out the intent of the parties. 
(Reformation.) 
(2) Whether the lower court erred in not 
determining that the parties intended that the divorce 
decree leave open the issue of ownership of the subject 
property to be determined at a later date and in then not 
determining that under the circumstances it should be 
awarded now to defendant. (Distribution of property not 
disposed of by divorce decree.) 
(3) Whether the lower court erred in not amending 
the decree due to changed circumstances. (Changed 
circumstances.) 
(4) Whether the lower court erred in awarding 
attorneys fees to plaintiff inasmuch as the real party in 
interest as to such fees was Keith L. Gurr rather than the 
plaintiff. (Attorneys fees.) 
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VI 
DETFRMINITIVF EXPRESS LAW 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations is determinitive of the 
issues in this case. 
VII 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature ot Case 
The proceedings which are the subject matter of 
this appeal consist of the property settlement involved in 
the 1982 divorce proceeding between the parties, a money 
•judgment taken thereafter in the names of both parties 
which was based on certain real property concerning which 
the divorce decree is silent as to its ownership and a 
petition by appellant (hereinafter "perry") to amend the 
divorce decree referred to above to make certain the award 
to him of the property upon which the "judgment was based. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The trial court denied Perry's motions to amend 
the divorce decree of the parties by amending Exhibit lfAf! 
to their Property Settlement and Child Custodv Agreement 
for one or more of the following reasons: (1) carry out 
the intention of the parties, (2) because the decree was 
deliberately intended to leave open the question of who 
should be awarded the property in question pending later 
developments and the later developments show that in 
-S-
fairness Perry should have that property, (3) a material 
change of circumstances, to wit the subsequent assignment 
to a tt\ird party, one Keith L. Gurr (hereinafter lfG\irr,f) of 
the fruits of that property for 0% of the value of the 
judgment. 
The lower court did not expressly address the 
latter two grounds urged as a basis for the relief 
requested, but by implication denied Perry's requested 
amendment on those grounds [given numbers (2) and (3) 
above1. 
The trial court also awarded Carolyn $6,765.00 in 
attorney's fees. 
Facts 
U FIRST ISSUE (REFORMATION) 
Carolyn filed suit for divorce against Perry on 
the 16th day of September, 1981 (R. 6). 
At the time of the divorce suit those parties were 
party defendants in a law suit in Utah County (No. S0224) 
filed by one Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr and they filed a 
counterclaim against those defendants and were awarded 
certain real property known as The Grayson Apartments 
before the divorce decree was entered Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald, 709 P2d 384. (Utah, 198S). 
Prior to the divorce suit Carolyn's father, 
Sterling W. Sill (hereinafter "Sill") arranged through his 
attorney, Allen M. Swan (hereinafter "Swan") to have 
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several properties owned by the Fitzgeralds transferred 
into the Sterling Company, a family corporation, which 
later deeded those properties to a trust set up for the 
benefit of the Fitzgeralds1 nine minor children (Deposition 
of Allen M. Swan, R. 141, P. 3, 4). The final trust 
document was dated August 6, 1982, two days before the 
divorce decree was entered (Swan, P. 5). The family 
residence of the Fitzgeralds in Draper had been foreclosed 
upon and purchased by Carolyn's brother, David Sill, who 
later deeded it to Carolyn, Before the divorce decree was 
entered it was agreed that Carolyn was to receive 25 acres 
in the Cedar Valley area of Utah County, which was then 
deeded to her and a house in Lehi, Utah. The Fitzgeralds 
lost the Lehi house during the divorce proceedings, so in 
lieu thereof Pery's stepfather, Eric Bennion (hereinafter 
IIEric,,) , deeded one-third of an acre lot adjacent to the 
family home. It was agreed that Perry was to receive all 
the remaining real property and that was itemized on an 
Exhibit "A". 
The agreements as to land referred to above were 
incorporated, together with other matters, in various 
drafts of the proposed Property Settlement and Child 
Custody Agreement referred to above (Exhibits 5-P, 6-P, 
7-P, 18-P, 19-P). Carolyn's attorney, Glen Lee Rudd 
(hereinafter "Rudd") prepared three drafts and on each of 
them the real property, which is the subject of this 
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lawsuit, to wit "2140 acres purchased from Corbett and Gurr 
or Leland Fitzgerald11 hereinafter "2140 acres11) was the 
first>item listed as Exhibit "A". The final draft was sent 
to Perry's counsel by letter dated May 4, 1982 (Exhibit 
9-P)• It was ^ approved with certain minor changes on the 
second page (which dealt with visitation rights with the 
children) and mailed to Rudd. Perry's signatiire was 
notarized by Rudd on June 6, 1982 and Carolyn signed it two 
days later (the same date she received the deed from Eric 
referred to above) (Exhibit 18-P). 
On May 11, 1982 Rudd requested by letter that the 
2140 acres referred to above be deeded to the Sterling 
Company for the benefit of the children (Exhibit 10-P) but 
this request was not carried out (Swan, R. 141 , P* 7; 
Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 32, 33). 
During discovery it was also established that 
Carolyn herself was not aware of the fact that. Exhibit ,fAlf 
in the court file did not include the 2140 acre property. 
She testified on that point (this after Gurr started urging 
her to sell out to him whatever she owned) as follows: 
The Witness: Mr. Benneson (sic) 
was explaining, I suppose, Perry's 
position in that at the time of the 
divorce that the Corbett and Gurr 
property was on Exhibit "A". And he 
showed me a rough draft that he had made 
himself, Mr. Benneson (sic), showing 
that it was on there. 
And at that time, I said to him, ".I 
would like it in writing, the final 
copy, showing that it's still there." 
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And he said at that time that 
"Perry was going to, or had gone down to 
the City and County Building to get a 
copy of the Divorce Decree to see if it 
was there." 
And I explained my position as far 
as -- as far as the phone call from my 
father and his attorney and that I would 
need more proof for what actually 
happened with that piece of property 
before I could make a decision. 
(Carolyn, R. 144, P. 25) 
To be fair it should be pointed out that in the 
deposition just quoted she later testified that "we (Rudd 
and Carolyn) decided that whereas a decision has been made 
that I would like my share of that judgment" (R. 144-, P. 
72). However, she also testified that said decision was 
implemented by Ruddfs letter of May 11, 1982 and that 
documents were executed to carry it out (R. 144, P. 73). 
Swan testified positively it was not done. He testified as 
follows on page 7 of R. 1M : 
Q. In connection with that, did you 
read the letter that he wrote to me, 
which I think is Exhibit "E"--I!ll 
show you a copy of that dated May 
11 , 1982? 
A. Yes, I read it. 
Q. Do you recall a reference to the 
trust that we've been talking about 
in that letter? 
A. I remember reading this. And I 
heard Mr. Rudd make mention of it in 
his deposition. 
Q. As you recall, in his deposition he 
said he wasn't sure whether there 
ever had been a transfer to the 
trust. 
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A. Yes. I'm sure there was not. 
At various times after it was discovered in 
November, 1985 that the Exhibit "A" in the court file was 
different from all the prior Exhibit lfAfls, Carolyn told 
Perry, Eric and one Joseph Sanchez that the amount of her 
claim had not changed (R. 136, P. 16, P. 32, 33, P. 44, 
45) . 
After the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the Fitzgeralds against Corbett and Gurr on November 1, 
1985, Carolyn and her attorney met Perry and his attorney 
(Eric Bennion and Joseph Sanchez were there too and the 
former fixed the date as being November 25, 1985 -- R. 136, 
P. 32-34.) at the Draper Bank and Trust Company and at that 
time she expected that bank to pay its letter of credit 
which guaranteed payment of the judgment up to $90,000.00 
(Exhibit 21-P) and from that she would receive the support 
money due her of $11,000.00 plus $3,500.00 and she then 
asked only S3,500.00 more (R. 136, P. 47, 48 and 76, 77). 
2. SECOND ISSUE (DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY NOT 
DISPOSED <0F BY DIVORCE DECREE) 
Caroyln and Rudd intended that the divorce decree 
would not determine ownership of the 2,140 acres in dispute 
but leave the ownership for determination at a later date 
(Carolyn, R. 144, P. 20, 21). 
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At the time of the divorce the value of the 
parties1 assets was much less than their debts. Rudd 
testified on this subject (R. 136, P. 3 and Appendix A. 
Par. 6, P. 35) . 
Perry's income since the divorce had been so 
minimal he had not even had to file income tax returns 
prior to the trial of this matter (R. 136, P. 2U , 25). He 
then owed sorae S4,900.00 in past due child support (Exhibit 
1-D, R. 136, P. 24.) (this in addition to the $11,000.00 in 
support and alimony and $2,886.22 attorney's fees paid 
through Gurr) and over $50,000.00 in other debts (Exhibit 
1-D) . 
3. THIRD ISSUE (CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES) 
The change of circumstances that occurred between 
August 8, 1082 and the petition to modify were primarily 
the purchase on December 19, 1985 by Gurr of "whatever 
interest, if any" Carolyn then had in the judgment of April 
19, 1983 affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 1, 1985 
(Gurr, R. 139, Exhibit 3). That purchase was for a price 
of 0% on the dollar according to Gurr's attorney's 
calculation on page 10 of his Memorandum dated April 8, 
1986 (Appendix B) computed as follows: 
(1) Carolyn's interest in judgment $38,351.35 
(2) Carolyn's child support and 
attorney's fees 13,720.^ -2 
(3) Carolyn's real property claim 9,616.56 
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(4) Carolyn1s payment for interests 
(1) through (3) above $21,500.00 
(her deposition, page 19) 
Total payment to Carolyn 21,500.00 
Payment for (2) above Si 3,720.42 
Payment for (3) above $9,616.56 
$23,336.98 
"Profit" Gurr made by buying (2) and 
(3) with (1) thrown in "for free" $1,836.98 
In order, however, to compute the sura, if any, 
Gurr paid for Carolyn's judgment interest, one would need 
to back out the interest between when she was paid on 
December 20, 1985 and the date of March 6, 1986 used in 
Gurr's computation set forth above. 
As of December 20, 1985: 
(1) Carolyn1s interest in judgment 
($38,351.25 (Gurr's figure above) 
less 32 days (not 767 because Gurr's 
interest on judgment computed only 
to January 21, 1986) at $32.93 per 
day ($28,322.88 divided by 860, 
number of days from 4-19-83 to 
1-21-86 which comes to $1,053.76 $37,297.59 
(2) Carolyn's child support and 
attorney's fees ($13,720.42, less 
$4,38 per day for 15 days from 
December 5 to December 20, which 
amounts to $65.70 $13,654.72 
(3) Carolyn's real property claim 
($9,616,567 - see $1,000.00 error on 
Gurr's total of $8,616.56 - less 
76 days from December 20 to 
March 6, 1986 at $1.91 per day, 
which totals $145.16) $9,471.40 
(4) Carolyn's payment for interests 
of (1) through (3) above $21,500.00 
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Payment for (2) above $13,6 54.72 
Payment for (3) above $ 9,471.40 
Total for interest other than judgment $23,126.12 
Paid for "judgment interest" 
Profit Gurr made by buying (2) and 
(3) with (1) thrown in""for free" $1,626.12 
4. FOURTH ISSUE (ATTORNEY'S FEES) 
Carolyn was approached by Gurr through his 
attorney within seven days after the judgment against him 
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court on November 1, 198S 
(Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P2d 384, Utah, 19«5) to sell 
whatever interest, if any," she had in the judgment against 
him (Gurr, R. 139, P. 15, Exhibit 3; Swan, R. 1 M , P. 8; 
Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 16). Rudd, her attorney, made 
sure that she would not be liable to Gurr for any express 
or implied warranties regarding any interest transferred to 
Gurr (Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 16). She had been paid 
in full the $21,500.00 agreed upon (Carolyn, R. 144, P. 19) 
xdhich purchased a claim against Perry of $13,720.42 for 
child support and attorney's fees and a property claim 
including interest of $9,616.56 (Appendix B). Carolyn had 
no financial interest at all in these proceedings including 
the payment of any attorney's fees (Gurr, R. 139, P. 16). 
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VIII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1 . AS TO FIRST ISSUE (REFORMATION) 
The parties intended that Perry should receive the 
subject property ("21 &0 acres purchased from Corbett and 
Ourr or Leland Fitzgerald") because (1) the decree states 
"7. REAL PROPERTY. The real property acquired by the 
parties during; their marriage should be distributed to the 
parties as follows: a. Plaintiff - none, b. Defendant -
See Exhibit 'A1." (2) Carolyn testified at trial that the 
parties had agreed that all the Cedar Valley property 
(which included the 2140 acres in question) should go to 
Perry except 25 acres that she received at the time of the 
divorce (R. 136, P. 47). (3) This property was not deeded 
to the Sterling company as requested by Ruddfs letter of 
May 11, 1Q82. (4) Carolyn went to the Draper State Bank on 
November 25, 1985 with the intention and expectation that 
she would receive $11,000,00 for back child support and 
alimony of $3,500.00 for the Lehi property she didn't 
receive as intended by the parties (due to a title 
defect). (5) She told Perry, Eric and Joseph Sanchez after 
November 1, 1985 and prior to November 25, 1985, that she 
was not changing her demand due to learning that the 2140 
acres were not listed in the Exhibit "A" filed with the 
divorce decree. (6) She told Perry after November 25, 1985 
and prior to December 19, 1985, he'd better get her some 
-M-
money soon as she was about to "cave in" to pressure at a 
time just before Christmas when she was in financial 
distress. 
2. A!3 TO THE SECOND ISSUE (DISTRIBUTION OF 
PROPERTY NOT DISPOSED OF LN THE DIVORCE DECREE 
Since the divorce decree says Carolyn is to 
receive none of the real propertv and since the subject 
2140 acres (from which the judgment in question is the 
fruit thereof) is not listed on the Exhibit "A" attached to 
the divorce decree which listed the real property Perry was 
to receive, it logically follows that this 2140 acres was 
not distributed by the divorce decree and thus remained as 
marital propertv that should be distributed bv clarifying 
or amending the decree and a fair distribution would award 
the property to Perrv in view of the marital obligations 
Perry was ordered to pay (in addition to $1,000.00 per 
month for alimony and child support) being "far in excess" 
of the value of their assets. 
3. AS TO 7TTE THIRD ISSUE (CHANCE (W 
CIRCUMSTANCES) 
Due to changed circumstances here (sale of 
Carolvn!s interest, if any, for $21,500.00 -- which was 
less than the amount of her claim for unpaid child support, 
alimony and loss of property) Perry stands to lose 
$38,351.35 plus interest if the modification is not made 
which the trial court has the power to grant and in equity 
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should do to avoid Gurr from obtaining a "windfall gain11 as 
a result of economic distress Carolyn was under just before 
Christmas of 1985 when the "sale11 was made. 
4. AS TO THE FOURTH ISSUE (ATTORNEY'S FEES) 
The legal services performed by Carolyn's attorney 
of record in these proceedings (not her attorney in the 
divorce case) were 100% for the benefit of Gurr (this same 
attorney represented Gurr in the "sale" of the judgment in 
question) and 0% for the benefit of Carolyn. The real 
party in interest, to wit, Gurr, not Carolyn or Perry 
should pay for those services. Gurr and Carolyn so agreed 
prior to the December 19, 1985 assignment of any interest 
Carolyn had in the subject judgment. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
1. REFORMATION 
There are abundant precedents that the remedy of 
reformation is appropriate to reform any contract so it is 
consistent with the intention and agreement of the 
parties. See generally 66 Am. Jur. 2d 556, "Reformation of 
Instruments11 Sec. 29 et seq. 
Several recent Utah Supreme Court cases have dealt 
with this subject. In Hattinger v. Jensen, 684 P2d 1271 
(Utah, 1984) the Court granted reformation of a deed even 
after the property had been sold where the purchaser had at 
least constructive notice of the error in the deed. In 
Rriggs v. Liddell, 669 P2d 770 (Utah, 1985) reformation was 
-16-
denied because the mistake, if any, was only unilateral. 
Absent fraud both parties must have intended a result 
different than that embodied in the instrument in question. 
In the instant case Perry gave direct testimony 
that the Exhibit "A" to the divorce decree was contrary to 
his intent (R. 136, P. 5)• Carolyn testified to the same 
effect without direct reference to Exhibit "A11. At page 47 
of the transcript of the trial (R. 136) she testified as 
follows: 
Q. Mrs. Knepper, at the time that you 
were negotiating for settling your 
property rights wasn't it true that 
it was agreed that all the Cedar 
Valley property should go to Mr. 
Fitzgerald except twenty-five acres 
which you received? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you receive the twenty-five 
acres? 
A. At the time of the divorce. 
Since the subject 2140 acres are in Cedar Valley 
(R. 144, P. 43) it is clear that Exhibit "A" did not 
represent Carolyn's intention any more than it did 
Perry's. Thus the mistake was mutual and equity requires 
reformation of Exhibit "A". 
The foregoing mistake as to Carolyn is further 
corroborated by additional clear and convincing evidence 
which consists of the following circumstantial evidence: 
(1) Rudd, Carolyn's attorney, had the ?140 acres set forth 
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on every copy of the Exhibit "A11 transmitted to Perry 
(Exhibits P-5, P-6 , P-7 , P-19). (2) The fact that this 
property was not deeded to Sterling company as requested by 
Rudd's letter of May 11, 1982 (Exhibit P-10). (3) Carolyn 
went to the Draper State Bank on November 25, T985, which 
was after the time it was discovered that the 2140 acres in 
question were not on the Exhibit "A" in the divorce court 
file, with the intention and expectation she would receive 
$11,000.00 for back child support and alimony and $3,500*00 
in lieu of the Lehi property she did not receive (due to a 
title defect) from the letter of credit for $90,000.00 that 
bank gave to Gurr and his partner in lieu of a supersedeas 
bond while he appealed the judgment in question to the Utah 
Supreme Court. (4) Carolyn told Perry, Eric Bennion and 
Joseph Sanchez after November 1, 1985 and prior to November 
25, 1985, that she was not changing her demand due to 
learning that the 2140 acres were not listed on the Court's 
Exhibit MAIf. (5) Carolyn told Perry that hefd better give 
her some money soon as she was about to "cave in11 to 
pressures at a time just before Christmas of 1985 when she 
was in financial distress (R. 136, P. 44, 45). 
2. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY MOT DISPOSED OF BY 
THE DIVORCE DECREE 
Was the subject property distributed in the 
divorce decree and if so to whom? Since the decree itself 
expressly stated that Carolyn was to receive "none" of the 
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real property, the subject property was awarded to Perry if 
it was awarded to anyone. 
The problem is it was not listed on the Exhibit 
"A" to the divorce decree that presumably listed all 
property awarded to Perry. 
If it was not awarded to either party, then it 
must be distributed now. 
Sec. 30-3-5(3) U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes 
or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or 
the distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
Since the real property from which the judgment in 
question was derived was not in fact distributed by the 
divorce decree, then the property produced by it (the 
judgment entered in Utah County in case No. 50224) 
necessarily must be distributed at this time in order that 
the judgment might be satisfied by the proper party. The 
1882 case of Whitmore v. Harden, 3 U. 121, 1 P. 465, held 
that the right of the Court to modify any order for 
distribution of property does not necessarily apply to the 
identical property held at the time of the divorce but 
generally as to any property held by the party against whom 
the modification is sought. 
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The parties at the time of their divorce owed far 
more in debts than they had assets (Appendix A, Par. 6, 
Rudd, P. 35). Even so, all the real property assets not 
involved in litigation went to Carolyn or her children 
(Carolyn, R. 144, P. 20 and 21; Swan, R. 141, P. 5; Exhibit 
10-P). The situation now in this regard is essentially the 
same. Faced with minimal income which is irregular, the 
debts from the marriage hang over Perry's head (Exhibit 
1-P). It is clearly equitable that this asset be 
distributed to him to assist in the liquidation of those 
debts including a substantial amount for unpaid support 
money due Carolyn ($4,900.00 as of the trial date) (Exhibit 
1-D). Furthermore, to award that property or its 
replacement to her is not to benefit her but Gurr, who paid 
absolutely nothing for it. See pages of this Brief supra. 
3. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 
Sec. 30-3-5-O) U.C.A. 1953 quoted above expressly 
applies to property awards as well as other aspects of 
divorce such as alimony, support money and custody. 
In the case of Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P2d 412 
(Utah, 1981) the Court pointed out that such modifications 
should be done "only with great reluctance and based on 
compelling reasons." 
Another applicable case is that of Becker v. 
Becker, 694 P2d 608 (Utah, 1984). There the Court 
emphasized the principle that the change of circumstances 
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must relate to that aspect of the decree that is being 
modified (there the custodial aspects). 
Perry's case clearly meets both the compelling 
reasons test of Foulger and the relationship of changed 
circumstances to the aspect to be modified test of Becker, 
It is hard to imagine a more drastic change of 
circumstances than for one to possess a half interest in a 
piece of property or a judgment that is worth several 
thousand dollars and then to lose it for nothing in return. 
Is such modification doing an injustice to Gurr? 
Certainly it would deprive him of an enormous profit from 
his December 19, 1985 purchase which he could applv to the 
judgment against him if Carolyn had the interest he claims 
for her. But would that be unfair? Did he not make his 
11
 investment11 knowing the risks? Surely his attorney must 
have told him of the risks recognized by the other 
attorneys involved. Rudd said "I didn't believe anybody 
would purchase her interests" and ,ftoo good to be true that 
anybody would actually come along and pay money for that to 
the tune of what I thought might be of val\ie to her" 
(Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 15-16). Swan said "and Lee 
and I pretty well agreed there would have to be a further 
hearing, in effect a supplemental hearing to the divorce" 
(Swan, R. 141, P. 13). These proceedings are the hearing 
referred to by Swan and the statute set forth above makes 
it clear that any such purchase would be subject to the 
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continuing jurisdiction of the Court. Certainly Gurr was 
no bona fide purchaser without notice of Perry's claim. No 
one could have been a bona fide purchaser of the judgment 
because neither the subject property nor the judgment in 
question were awarded to Carolyn in the divorce decree (R. 
34-38) . 
The equities between a modification that will 
benefit one whose work and toil created an asset he 
preserved through two district court trials and an appeal 
to the Utah Sxipreme Court and the denial of that 
modification for someone who literally bought "something 
for nothing11 seems too self evident to require any further 
argument. 
4. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The rationale for awarding attorney's fees in 
divorce cases is set forth in Sec. 589 of "Divorce and 
Separation" in 24 Am. Jur• 2d 594 as follows: 
"Suit money," which includes 
counsel fees, may be defined as the 
money necessary to enable a spouse to 
carry on or defend a matrimonial 
action. The rules that govern the 
allowance of suit money, including 
attorney fees, are ordinarily the same 
as those that govern the allowance of 
temporary alimony. It has been said 
that in suits for divorce it is usual to 
award, in addition to what a spouse may 
be entitled to as costs, a sum of money 
sufficient to prosecute or defend the 
suit in an efficient manner to a final 
hearing, and that such allowances are 
absolutely essential to the proper 
assertion of marital rights which a 
spouse might be unable to establish if 
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the other spouse were not required to 
assist in this regard. The right to 
suit money for the purpose of enabling a 
spouse to protect rights exists even 
though the sum awarded ultimately 
belongs to an attorney, 
A limitation thereon is set forth in the following 
section as follows at page 599: 
If the proceeding wherein the 
services were rendered does not involve 
marital rights, the dependent spouse is 
not entitled to an allowance to 
compensate the attorney. 
In this instance we have exactly such a 
situation. Carolyn1s marital rights, if any, in the 2140 
acres upon x^ hich the money judgment against Gurr came into 
existence were established by the divorce decree entered in 
August, 1982, not by the action tried on November 5, 1986. 
The legal services performed by James Brown, the 
attorney who represented Gurr in the purchase of Carolyn!s 
interest, if any, in the judgment against Gurr in the 
action in question benefited only Gurr and not Carolyn at 
all. 
It was known at the outset, that is at the time of 
the assignment of any rights in the subject judgment which 
occurred on December 18, 1985, that fees for legal services 
would be borne by Gurr not Carolyn. This was so obviously 
the lawyer and sellers intention that it was not even 
discussed. As to that understanding the deposition of Gurr 
at page 16 (R. 139) reads as follows: 
-23-
Q. (By Mr. Hansen) All right. Did she 
have any obligation to pay anv fees 
in connection with claims that were 
being assigned to you? 
A. I don't know what her deal was with 
her attorney, and she didn't have 
any agreement with me on anything 
that she would be held for payment. 
It wasn't even discussed. 
Q. But let's put it this way. You 
didn't expect her, did you, to pay 
any legal expense that you would 
have in pursuing a claim she was 
assigning to you? 
A. No. I'll handle these here expenses 
on that document that we bought her 
deal (indicating). 
Q. And that includes attorney's fees? 
A. It should do. 
Even when the award of attorney's fees are proper 
the allowance of them is discretionarv. See Sec. 591 
"Discretion of Court" 24 Am. Jur. 2d 596 which reads inter 
alia as follows: 
Whether an allowance of suit money 
and counsel fees shall be made in the 
case at bar rests in the judicial 
discretion of the court, to be exercised 
in view of the conditions and 
circumstances of each case. Abuse of 
discretion is necessarily subject to 
review; 
* * * 
While the allowance of suit money 
or attorney fees is within the 
discretion of the court, the power 
should not be exercised unless a spouse 
establishes a prima facie right thereto 
(Citation omitted). 
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In the instant case an award of any amount was not 
proper since no benefit to Carolyn was involved. Even if 
some marital ripjit were involved to some extent the award 
was an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances of 
this case. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The divorce decree should be modified by amending 
Exhibit "A" thereof to conform to all the copies thereof 
that Perry ever saw and the decree should expressly award 
all interest in the judgment of April 19, 1983 to Perry on 
the basis of either reformation, distribution of 
undistributed property or on the basis of changed 
circumstances (sale of December 19, 1985) to do equity 
under all the circumstances. Also the award of $6,750.00 
attorney's fees should be vacated as those fees should be 
paid by Gurr, the sole beneficiary thereof. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of January, 
1989. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Attorney for 
Respondent addressed to James R. Brown, Attorney at Law, 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 , Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this 12th day of January, 1989. 
Robert B. Hansen 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Robert B. Hansen, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. He is counsel for defendant in the case of Fitzgerald v. 
Fitzgerald, D81-3721. 
2. The deposition of Lee Rudd who represented the plaintiff 
in said case at the time of the parties divorce in 1982 and until the 
present proceeding began was deposed in said case on the 5th day of 
iMay, 1986. 
3. In the instant proceedings counsel of the parties 
stipulated that the deposition transcript of the said Lee Rudd, 
though unsigned, should be part of the evidence in this case subject 
to objection as to relevancy (R. 136, P. 3). 
4. The preparation of the record in this case was delayed 
when said deposition transcript and others could not be located (R. 
145). 
5. After all due diligence the transcript of Lee Rudd's 
deposition has not been located, hence this affidavit. 
6. The following are exact quotations of the testimony of 
the said Lee Rudd taken from affiant's copy of said transcript: 
i 
Page 15, line 8 through Page 16, line 3: 
Q. Didn't you make a notation somewhere in your 
records as to what the opening offer was? 
A. I could have. There were—initially I would 
have heard from Carolyn; and whether I wrote 
it down—to be honest with you, I guess I 
thought that it was, initially was—I didn't 
believe anybody would purchase her interests. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. I guess I thought it was too good a thing to 
be true that anybody would actually come along 
and pay money for that to the tune of what I 
thought might be of value to her. 
Q. Was the amount increased as a result of your 
negotiations? 
A. I don't believe that amount was increased. I 
wish I could remember even what it was. I 
think that it was more of talking what 
Carolyn's warranties or protections, interests 
of what she was conveying. That was the main 
discussions that we had. And, as I remember, 
that was the main redrafting of the document. 
It wasn't, as I recall, from Day One that she 
said, "Well, I won't sell for this price," or 
"I've got to have more money." That was never 
the obstacles. 
Page 16, lines 4-12: 
Q. The final agreement makes it very clear that 
she didn't warrant that she had any interest? 
A. That was what I was attempting to do in the 
thing. I think there are some warranties, 
although it says not in some ways. But I 
think there were some inherent, and—but—the 
main thing, we didn't understand a great deal 
of what the judgment was, and it had never 
really been to the Supreme Court. I think I 
read the order, but it was in the process. We 
didn't know what was out there. 
ii 
Page 32, line 12 through Page 33, line 1: 
Q. Now with respect to your Exhibit "E" to that 
affidavit, your letter dated May 11 to me 
where you propose that Carolyn execute an 
assignment and quitclaim of any interests she 
has in the property or the results of your 
suit to the Sterling company, was that ever 
done? 
A. Which one, now? Are you in the letter? 
Q. Second paragraph. 
A. Which part? 
Q. Right in the middle. "I would propose." 
(Witness examines.) 
Q. It's the third sentence. 
A. I don't recall if that was ever actually 
done. There was an assignment and quitclaim 
deeds to the Sterling company and to the 
trust. As to whether one was for that 
particular one, I'm not sure. 
Page 35, lines 10-16: 
Q. In her deposition I represent to you that 
Carolyn's recollection was that the 
liabilities exceeded the assets. Is that your 
recollection also? 
A. I suppose that that would have a great deal of 
bearing on what value you put on the assets, 
but it would be my testimony that the 
liabilities far exceeded the assets, yes. 
7. Attached hereto is a certified copy of the order which 
consolidated the case which is the subject matter of this appeal with 
Case No. C86-551. This is to tie in with the record cited on page 10 
of this brief. 
iii 
Dated this 11th day of January, 1989. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of January, 1989. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
iv 
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„ __., 15=1344 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PERRY G. FITZGERALD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEITH L. GURR and DRAPER 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
Defendant 
STIPULATION FOR AND ORDER 
OF CONSOLIDATION 
D8J-3721 with this case 
C£86£55T} 
Judge; James Sawaya 
STIPULATION 
Comes now the parties hereto through their undersigned counsel 
and stipulate and agree that the order set forth below should be entered 
pursuant to Rule 42, URCP because of the questions of law and fact that 
are common to both actions. 
Dated this $** day of l\priV^{9S6. 
JA|E#-fW-BRQWttf 
Attorney for above defendants and for 
Carolyn Knepper, p l a i n t i f f in D81-3721 
O R D E R 
Upon reading the above stipulation and good cause appearing 
therefore 
IT IS ORDERED that this case and the case of D81-3721 be 
consblId*ted for the purpose of trying the issues now pending in these 
two cases. 
Dated this day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
J U D G E 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CI* * 
ByS„, \ \Wir\v-' \ , ' \ ^ 
$t>"ty Clerk 
' CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AB-
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRr 
DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF 
UTAH 
*6fdnHrriTfor Difindaiit 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 \jw :.r--jTY CLERK 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
PERRY G. 
vs. 
KEITH L. 
FITZGERALD, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
GURR and DRAPER ) 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ) 
KEITH L. 
VS. 
PERRY G. 
ROBERT B 
Defendant. ) 
GURR, ) 
Plaintiff/ ) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
FITZGERALD, ) 
. HANSEN, and ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF, ) 
Defendants. ) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF GURRfS MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 86-551 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
COMES NOW Defendant Gurr by and through counsel of 
record, James R. Brown, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & 
Dunn and submits the following Memorandum in Support of his 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
1. On May 4, 1982, Perry Fitzgerald and Carolyn 
Fitzgerald were awarded a Judgment against Gurr and Corbett in 
the Utah County Case No. 50224, ordering Corbett and Gurr to 
return an Apartment Building. 
2. Subsequently it was determined that the Apartment 
Complex could not be returned and a money judmgnet was rendered 
in favor of Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald on April 19, 1983. 
3. Corbett and Gurr filed an Appeal on the Judgment 
in 50224 which Appeal was decided on November 1, 1985, in favor 
of Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald. 
4. Gurr purchased the interest of Carolyn Fitzgerald 
(now Carolyn Knepper) on December 19, 1985, of her one-half of 
the Judgment in 50224, some past due child support due from 
Perry to Carolyn in the amount of $10,440.00, attorney fees in 
the amount of $2,886.22 and a claim of $7,000 arising out of 
the property settlement of the divorce. 
5. Gurr caused to be tendered to Plaintiff and/or 
Plaintifffs counsel the following: 
A. All attorney fees of $36,598.00; 
B. Satisfaction of the past due child support 
Judgment and attorney fees, and real property claim 
which totalled $23,077.95; 
C. The payment of $15,135.23 to Perry Fitzgerald; 
D. And coupled with the interest previously owned 
by Carolyn Knepper, the entire judgment in Case No. 
50224. 
#V JM**?t>«flt: to tbm taff ir»ance. Defendant Gutr 
tendered on three occasions full satisfaction of the Judgment: 
A. January 17, 1986 in person to B. Hansen; 
B. January 21, 1986 hand delivery to B. Hansen; 
C. January 21, 1986 hand delivery to B. Hansen at 
Sheriff's Sale. 
7. On 9-16-81 Carolyn Knepper filed for a Divorce 
against Perry Fitzgerald under Case No. D81-3721 in Salt Lake 
County. 
8. That the parties had acquired a number of parcels 
of real property during the term of the marriage. 
9. Prior to the Divorce action, Robert B. Hansen 
represented both Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald in the pending 
Utah County Case No. 50224. 
10. Negotiations were commenced to effectuate a 
settlement between the parties and to this end Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto is a proposed Settlement Agreement which was 
drafted in February, 1981. 
11. On May 4, 1982, Judge Bullock rendered his 
decision in Case No. 50224, a copy of which is hereto attached 
as Exhibit "B". 
12. On May 5, 1982f Robert B. Hansen called Lee Rudd 
who was counsel for Carolyn Knepper and advised him of Judge 
Bullock's ruling. 
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B* B&naen who vas representing Perry Fitzgerald in the Divorce 
matter asserting that Carolyn wanted an interest in the 
Corbett-Gurr property and/or judgment, a copy of said letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C11. 
14. In response thereto, Robert B. Hansen wrote a 
letter to Mr. Rudd, a copy of which is hereto attached as 
Exhibit "D", wherein the Corbett-Gurr property is removed from 
the Settlement Agreement as per Mr. Hansen's request. 
15. On June 8r 1982, the Settlement Agreement is 
executed by Perry Fitzgerald and Carolyn Fitzgerald which 
Agreement specifically changes the Awarding of the 
"Corbett-Gurr" property to Perry. (Exhibit "E"). 
16. On August 4, 1982, after reviewing the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Decree, Mr. Hansen executed and delivered 
to Mr. Rudd a Consent to Default Judgment and Waiver, Exhibit 
"F". 
17. On July 2, 1983, and again on August 6, 1983, Mr. 
Hansen wrote to Mr. Rudd to update him on the Corbett-Gurr 
matter. 
18. In early November, 1985, Mr. Hansen advised Mr. 
Rudd by telephone that the Judgment in the Corbett-Gurr matter 
had been affirmed. 
19. On November 22, 1985, Mr. Rudd wrote to Mr. Hansen 
about the distribution of the Corbett-Gurr Judgment, Exhibit 
"G". 
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 a n d attorney 
fees, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "H". 
21. Thereafter, Gurr purchased the one-half interest 
of Carolyn Knepper, the Judgment for past due support and 
attorney fees and other claims. 
22. Gurr tendered full satisfaction and finally 
payment was made after an Order of this Court provided for 
Satisfaction. 
23. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel having full 
knowledge of all of the foregoing facts held a Sheriff's sale 
on January 21, 1986. 
24. Gurr has had to incur costs and attorney fees to 
remove the Sheriff's sale and to secure execution of the 
Satisfaction, Exhibit "F" to the Findings of Fact heretofore 
made by this Court. 
25. During these proceedings, Defendant Gurr has been 
denied credit as a result of the Sheriff's sale, and has lost 
two potential sales of real property because of the Sheriff's 
sale on two parcels "sold at said Sheriff's sale." 
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THERE ARE NO MATERIAL ISSUES 
OF FACT IN DISPUTE AND GURR IS 
ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Affidavit of Lee Rudd sets forth in detail the 
negotiations, changes and final execution of the Property 
Settlement and Child Custody Agreement between Perry and 
Carolyn Fitzgerald in the Divorce action. It is undisputed 
that: 
A. In the initial negotiations Perry was to 
receive the Corbett-Gurr property; 
B. After May 4, 1982, (the date of ruling) there 
was a change wherein Carolyn wanted her share of the 
Corbett-Gurr judgment; 
C. There was correspondence between the 
respective counsel, May 11, 1982, Rudd to Hansen, and 
June 1, 1982, from Hansen to Rudd; 
D. The Corbett-Gurr property and others were 
removed from Exhibit "A" to the Settlement Agreement; 
E. The parties executed the final Agreement with 
the Corbett-Gurr matter removed. 
Gurrfs subsequent purchase of Carolyn Knepper1s 
interest was a means of satisfying the Judgment. Gurr is 
entitled, as a matter of law to a Declaratory Judgment 
declaring that the one-half interest he purchased from Carolyn 
Knepper is his and to quiet title to him of said interest. 
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If 
PLAINTIFF SLANDERED 
GURR'S TITLE 
On January 21f 1986, in utter disregard of the tenders 
of payment, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel caused the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff to conduct a sale of certain of Mr. Gurr's 
real property. This sale was done at a point in time when 
Plaintiff knew: 
A. Gurr owned one-half of the Judgment; 
B. Gurr had tendered the remaining payment. 
The sale placed a cloud on the title and was done for 
the sole purpose of causing Gurr damage and injury. There can 
be no other basis for the Sheriff's Sale inasmuch as full 
payment had earlier been tendered. To add further evidence of 
the bad faith of Plaintiff, Plaintiff refused to execute the 
Satisfaction of Judgment heretofore ordered by the Court. 
Under § 38-9-1 et seq. the Legislature provided a 
penalty for wrongfully claiming "an interest in, or a lien or 
encumbrance against, real property . . .". Plaintiff, by the 
sale, by not satisfying the Judgment subjected himself to 
damaged of $1000 or treble actual damages, whichever is greater 
and for reasonable attorney's fees. 
Mr. Gurr has incurred attorney fees and costs of this 
action for the blatant and willful clouding of his title to the 
real property. 
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Ill 
CHAMPERTY DOES NOT LIE 
AGAINST MR. GURR 
Mr. Gurr had an express right to satisfy the Judgment 
in 50224 by paying one of the joint owners of the judgment a 
sum for her interest. It is well stated in 14 Am.Jur. 2d P. 
848 § 10 Champerty and Maintenance which provides in part: 
The common-law doctrine of champerty 
and maintenance has been relaxed so that the 
bona fide assignee of a chose in action or a 
judgment can generally sue in any court of 
law or equityf the defendant retaining all 
legal or equitable defenses that he might 
have asserted against the assignor. 
The cases cited under the foregoing are dispositive of this 
matter. In Holmes v. Clark 274 Ky. 349, 118 SW2d 758 the court 
declared that the outright purchase of the entire beneficial 
interest in a chose of action is deemed to be free from the 
taint of champerty. They went further to distinguish the 
situation wherein advancement is made to aid prosecution of a 
claim in exchange for a share of the proceeds. 
Gurr purchased outright the interest of Carolyn 
Knepper. He is not sharing the proceeds with anyone. The 
litigation was completed before his purchase. He simply wanted 
to satisfy the adverse judgment. Plaintiff asserts some secret 
interest in the one-half owned by Carolyn Knepper and then 
accuses Gurr of champerty. If any champerty and/or maintenance 
has occurred it is on the part of Plaintiff. 
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IV 
INTEREST IS APPROPRIATE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Plaintiff asserts that there should not be any 
interest assessed him on: 
A. The Judgment for past due child support and 
attorney fees; 
B. And on the claim for $7,000. 
Plaintiff does not deny the validity of both the Judgment and 
the claim. 
Under 15-1-4 UCA, the Legislature provided: 
Any judgment . . . shall bear interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum. 
In the case of Dairy Distributors Inc. v. Local Union 976, 16 
U.2d 85, 396 P. 2d 47, our court declared that under the 
provisions of 15-1-4 UCA, interest as provided in the statute 
follows the judgment as a matter of law and would be 
collectible even though the judgment did not so provide. 
Under 15-1-1 UCA, the Legislature provided in part: 
Except when parties to a lawful 
contract agree on a specified rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for the 
loan or forebearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
The parties, Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald, did not agree or 
specify * any rate of interest, therefore 10% is the rate of 
interest due to Carolyn Knepper (now Gurr) on the forebearance 
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of the adaittfrd f7,000 due to her. The following is therefore 
the calculation of interest on both the Judgment and the $7,000 
claim: 
Judgment 
Child Support $10,440.50 
Attorney fees 2,886.22 
TOTAL JUDGMENT $13,326.22 
Interest § 12% = $4.38 per day 
Interest from December 5, 1985 to 
March 6, 1986 = 90 days = $394.20 
Total Judgment with interest = $13,720.42 
Interest on $7,000 Claim 
Carolyn received a Deed for property dated June 8, 
1982. The property was to be free and clear but was 
encumbered by a prior agreement in favor of Angell. 
$7,000 @ 10% interest from June 8, 1982 to March 6, 
1986 is 3 years, 8 months, and 26 days or $2,616.56. 
Interest on the 50224 Judgment is calculated as 
follows: 
Principal of Judgment = $ 62,100.00 
interest from 3-6-78 to 5-14-81 = $11,822.21 
interest from 5-14-81 to 4-19-83 = 11,994.61 
$23,876.82 23,876.82 
85,976.82 
interest from 4-19-83 to 1-21-86 = 28,322.88 
Sub total through 1-21-86 $114,300.70 
Less credits from Executions 1,000.00 
Net due as of 1-21-86 $113,300.70 
Amounts Paid 
Total Judgment 1-21-86 
Attorney fees to Robert Hansen 
One-half to Carolyn 
Credit to Judgment 
Credit to $7,000 claim 
$ 1 1 3 , 3 0 0 . 
3 6 , 5 9 8 , 
7 6 , 7 0 2 , 
3 8 , 3 5 1 , 
3 8 , 3 5 1 , 
$ 1 3 , 7 2 0 , 
8 ,616 
.70 
.70 
.70 
.35 
.35 
.42 
.56 
23,336.98 
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Utt fe* »Tingp 15 , 014 .37 
Aaotuit paid to Perry 15,135.23 
Over payment due to Gurr 120.86 
CONCLUSION 
Gurr is entitled to the following Judgment: 
A. Declaratory Judgment in his favor establishing 
that one-half of the judgment in 50224 belonged to 
Carolyn Knepper and now Keith L. Gurr; 
B. A Decree quieting title to certain real 
property and for damages of $1000 or treble actual 
damages, whichever is greater, and attorney fees and 
costs against Fitzgerald and Hansen jointly and 
severally; 
C. For Summary Judgment in favor of Gurr denying 
any relief for Plaintiff for champerty; 
D. For Judgment against Defendant Perry 
Fitzgerald in the amount of $120.86; 
E. Reserving only the cause of action for offset 
on the pending Fourth District Court ..matter. 
DATED this (7 day of fypfii, 1986. 
/ 
/ / J A R D I N E / ^ I N E B A U G H , BRpfW& DUNN 
y 
0^oTn€jsfo'r Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP GURR1S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, on this X day of April, 1986, and addressed to 
the following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JRB-P235 
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l CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF 
UTAH. 
DEPU"T'v COU 
/ / /??? 
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DO RT CLERK 
